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Abstract
Deadlines are common in product development and are often felt to be too harsh – many devel-
opment efforts are still worth continuing at the time of mandated termination. We examine the
value of deadlines from the agency-theoretic perspective. We consider a firm that pays an agent
to lead product development activities. The chance of success depends on the viability of the
project and the effort of the agent. As the project proceeds without success, doubts grow as to
whether the project is viable. To motivate continued effort, the firm must promise the agent a
generous reward if success is achieved during the late stage of development. However, rewarding
late success undermines effort incentives in the early stage. The firm may find it more profitable
to impose a hard, early deadline to eliminate the agent’s dynamic incentive to procrastinate. We
derive conditions under which the firm should impose such deadlines.
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1 Introduction
Deadlines are commonly used in the product development process (e.g., Gersick 1988; Gersick 1989;
Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995; Lindkvist, So¨derlund and Tell 1998; Kerzner 2013). In an empirical
study of the global computer industry, Eisenhardt and Tabrizi (1995) find that frequent deadlines
help accelerate product development. In a case study of Ericsson Radio, Lindkvist, So¨derlund and
Tell (1998) document strict enforcement of deadlines, highlighting a project manager’s comments
that “If we said that it was to be ready by Friday, we did not accept anything else.”
Deadlines are often felt to be “too harsh.” Many projects would benefit from having more time
when deadlines hit. Product Development Advantage Group, a Massachusetts-based management
consulting company, emphasizes the inability to meet deadlines as a central problem in product
development.1 Quality Digest Magazine questions the frequent exertion of aggressive and wasteful
deadlines.2 Sean Ellis, a startup guru, laments the high likelihood of missing deadlines when prod-
uct development is susceptible to random factors.3 The Standish Group’s survey of 8,000 software
projects indicates that more than 80% failed to meet their respective deadlines (Wu, Balasubrama-
nian and Mahajan 2004).4
In this paper, we aim to understand the value of deadlines from the agency-theoretic perspective.
We consider a firm that pays an agent to lead product development activities. Product development is
fraught with uncertainty (Urban and Hauser 1993). Oftentimes neither the firm nor the agent knows
for sure whether an idea would eventually lead to a successful product. The agent’s development
effort thus serves dual purposes in this uncertain environment. It not only contributes to success but
also generates information about the project’s inherent chance for success, because the quality of an
idea is often learned through trials. As time passes without success, pessimism grows as to whether
the project is inherently fruitful. To motivate continued effort during the late stage of product
development, the firm must offer the agent a generous reward for achieving success. However,
rewarding late success undermines the agent’s incentive to work diligently in the early stage of
1Source: http://pd-advantage.com/images/7_Steps_to_Improve_RD_thruput.pdf.
2Source: http://www.qualitydigest.com/feb/product.html.
3Source: http://venturehacks.com/articles/sean-ellis-interview.
4To further assess the prevalence of deadlines, in spring 2015 we surveyed 105 professionals with self-reported product
development experience. We asked each survey participant to evaluate the statement “the company I work(ed) with
enforces hard deadlines in the product development process” on a 5-point Likert scale, with 1 being “never” and 5
being “always.” Figure A1(a) of the Appendix presents the results. The average response is 3.619, which is significantly
higher than the neutral value of 3 (t = 5.545, p < 0.0001). We also asked survey participants to evaluate the statement
“some of the products are still worth continuing at the time of the deadline” on a 5-point Likert scale, with 1 being
“strongly disagree” and 5 being “strongly agree.” Figure A1(b) shows the results. The average response is 3.829,
which is also significantly higher than 3 (t = 9.037, p < 0.0001).
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product development. Imposing a hard, early deadline thus helps the firm battle procrastination in
the workforce, even if the project is still worth continuing when the deadline hits – that is, even
if the project still generates positive expected values for the firm given the latest belief about its
chance of success.
This interpretation of deadlines relies on companies using extrinsic rewards to motivate product
development efforts. The role of rewards on effort motivation has been widely recognized in the
agency theory literature (e.g., Holmstro¨m 1979). Rewards are also frequently seen in real-world new
product development processes. Pragmatic Marketingr surveyed over 1500 individuals responsible
for product management and marketing in 2012. About 80 percent of respondents received a bonus.5
Burroughs et al. (2011)’s qualitative study of 20 companies finds that 15 offer incentive programs
during new product development. Examples include employee bonuses for making a significant
product development contribution, a trip to a desired destination for launching a promising new
product, and annual merit raises contingent on meeting innovation expectations. Markham and Lee
(2013) present the results of the Product Development and Management Association (PDMA)’s 2012
Comparative Performance Assessment Study. Based on a sample of 453 companies they find that a
variety of incentives and rewards are used to motivate new product development personnel, among
which the use of financial-based rewards saw the largest increase since the previous PDMA survey
by Barczak, Griffin and Kahn (2009). In particular, best-practice companies, compared with the
rest, use significantly more rewards tied to project success such as project completion celebration
and the opportunity to increase project responsibilities.
Empirical studies suggest that rewards can indeed motivate product development effort (e.g.,
Zengera and Lazzarinib 2004).6 It is also commonly accepted that larger rewards are needed to
motivate effort on more challenging projects.7 However, the effect of rewards in dynamics settings
is more nuanced. A forward-looking employee’s decision of whether to work and when to work
will depend on the dynamics of the reward system, especially if his current effort affects his future
earnings. There is empirical evidence that employees do engage in this type of strategic planning.
For example, Misra and Nair (2011) find that salespeople shade current effort in order to convince
the firm that sales quotas are difficult to attain (e.g., due to poor territory potential) so that the
5Source: https://pragmatic-marketing-469ad240.s3.amazonaws.com/PDF/AnnualSurvey2013Final.pdf.
6In the sales domain, Chung, Steenburgh, and Sudhir (2014) find that bonuses indeed enhance productivity.
7In the same survey described in footnote 4, we asked each participant to evaluate the statement “the less likely
the product is going to succeed, the greater incentives the company has to offer to motivate its product development
workforce” on a 5-point Likert scale, with 1 being “strongly disagree” and 5 being “strongly agree.” As Figure A1(c)
of the Appendix shows, participants tend to agree with this statement. The average response is 3.514, which is
significantly higher than the neutral value of 3 (t = 3.984, p = 0.00013).
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firm will lower its sales goals down the path. The mechanism in our paper can be similarly stated
as: the product development agent shirks current effort to convince the firm that success is difficult
to reach (due to low viability of the project) so that the firm will offer a more generous reward for
success in the future.
The agent’s dynamic incentive to shirk exacerbates the firm’s payroll burden. The question is
whether payroll cost is a first-order consideration for companies in managing new product develop-
ment. The answer is yes for many. Companies participating in PDMA’s 2012 survey list “total cost
of new product effort” as one of the most important metrics to evaluate new product development
projects, with best-practice companies putting significantly more emphasis on this metric than the
rest (Markham and Lee 2013). In the Netherlands, the labor costs of R&D personnel have drawn
significant attention such that the government launched a policy instrument called WBSO, which
allows companies to reduce development costs by receiving a tax credit for the wages of employees
working on R&D projects.8
In short, the findings of this paper are relevant to companies who use rewards to motivate product
development effort and who are interested in economizing the labor cost of product development.
For these companies, we offer managerial recommendations on when to impose hard deadlines. We
find that hard deadlines are more suitable if the agent’s cost of effort is higher, if the firm’s yield
from success is lower, if the agent is more patient, if the firm is less patient, or if the prior belief of
the project is more pessimistic. Interestingly, hard deadlines may be more useful when the agent is
more productive. This is because delayed success in spite of high productivity signifies the project’s
pessimistic nature, which means the firm must offer a significant reward for success in the late
stage of development to maintain the agent’s incentive to work. Rewarding late success lavishly
exacerbates the agent’s tendency to procrastinate, and the firm will in fact be better off enforcing
a hard deadline early on. Based on these findings, we discuss the applicability of hard deadlines
to internal vs. external agents, core vs. ancillary products, cumulative development efforts, and
successive development projects. We also discuss possible levers companies can use in place of hard
deadlines.
8Source: http://english.rvo.nl/subsidies-programmes/wbso-research-and-development-rd-tax-credit.
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2 Literature Review
Why do companies impose deadlines in the product development process? First, product develop-
ment is often time-sensitive. Deadlines signify that development must finish by natural stopping
points such as the closing of the sales window (Cohen, Eliashberg, and Ho 1996), a fixed launch
date (Joglekar et al. 2001), or the end of the available time allocated to a specific development
activity (Kerzner 2013). Second, product development may require teamwork. A deadline serves
as a common focal point for all, which helps synchronize efforts and facilitate work flow (Kerzner
2013). Third, deadlines help mitigate product developers’ tendency to procrastinate. Our model of
deadlines focuses on the third effect. To abstract away from the first two effects, we will restrict
attention to hard, “premature” deadlines that precede the end of the available time for development
(to be defined in Section 3), and will focus on a single product development agent such that effort
synchronization is irrelevant.
Past research has studied the source of procrastination and the value of deadlines in battling
procrastination. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) posit that procrastination results from people’s
psychological tendency to overvalue current utilities. Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) find that people
recognize their self-control problems and try to combat them by committing to costly deadlines.
Bonatti and Ho¨rner (2011) study moral hazard among collaborators. They find that freeriding
generates procrastination – each contributor postpones his effort in the hope that others’ efforts
would suffice. Imposing a deadline is thus beneficial because it accelerates effort from the whole
group.9 Our paper focuses on a different mechanism underlying procrastination. We assume that
the product development agent has no psychological bias or freeriding tendency. He shirks effort
today in order to earn a lucrative reward for success tomorrow.
This paper also contributes to the literature on project termination decisions. Previous research
has explored why some projects seem to stop too late. Reasons include project managers’ excessive
optimism (March and Shapira 1987), escalating commitment to chosen paths (Boulding, Morgan
and Staelin 1997), and ignorance of negative information (Biyalagorsky, Boulding and Staelin 2006).
Simester and Zhang (2010) find that bad products are hard to kill because managers have better
knowledge about project quality. Rewarding managers for killing bad products weakens their in-
centive to work – they can always shirk effort, claim that the project is bad, and be rewarded. We
9Also in a team setting, Campbell, Ederer, and Spinnewijn (2014) find that deadlines help motivate effort and
reduce delays. In their paper, delays happen because of freeriding and the lack of communication, as agents conceal
their progress to maintain their partners’ incentives to work hard.
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share Simester and Zhang (2010)’s view that firms’ tradeoff between project returns and payroll
costs affects their project termination decisions. Our paper complements this literature by asking
when firms would find it optimal to terminate a project that is still worth continuing.10
Finally, this paper is related to the literature on dynamic moral hazard. Bergemann and Hege
(2005) study the financing of innovative ventures, and find that equilibrium funding stops too early
compared with the first-best case in which the investor and entrepreneur are integrated. However, the
authors do not focus on an investor’s ex ante commitment to early withdrawal of funding. Funding
stops too early because, compared with the first-best case, both the investor and entrepreneur incur
opportunity costs of fund use, which raises the bar as to what is worth funding above the first-best
level. The problem persists even if the investor observes the entrepreneur’s fund use. In contrast, our
model allows the firm to commit to early termination of product development with a hard deadline.
The firm may endogenously choose to end the project prematurely after trading off the continuation
value of the project and the excessive compensation to the agent. The commitment to premature
termination becomes unnecessary once the firm observes the agent’s effort choice. Moreover, as we
will discuss later, in Bergemann and Hege (2005), the entrepreneur’s need to attract future funding
motivates appropriate use of current funding, whereas the agent’s dynamic incentive generates the
opposite effect in our paper – it exacerbates the agent’s current moral hazard problem.11
3 Model Setup and Preliminary Analysis
3.1 Model Setup
We consider a firm who pays an agent to lead a product development project over a maximum of
two periods.12 The project must terminate by the end of the second period for exogenous reasons.
10There is a large literature on product development. Previous research has investigated how firms’ new product
strategies interact with, for example, buyer self-selection (Moorthy 1984), product obsolescence (Levinthal and Purohit
1989), R&D and Engineering metrics (Hauser 1998), distribution channel relationship (Villas-Boas 1998), demand
uncertainty (Desai 2000), dynamic competition (Ofek and Sarvary 2003), network effects (Sun, Xie, and Cao 2004),
firm alliances (Amaldoss and Rapoport 2005), idea generation (Toubia 2006), channel acceptance (Luo, Kannan, and
Ratchford 2007), subjective characteristics (Luo, Kannan, and Ratchford 2008), sequential entry (Ofek and Turut 2008),
reference group effects (Amaldoss and Jain 2010), innovation incentives (Manso 2011), and consumer deliberation (Guo
and Zhang 2012). The incentive design aspect of this paper is also related to the literature on sales force compensation
(e.g., Basu et al. 1985; Lal and Staelin 1986; Rao 1990; Coughlan and Narasimhan 1992; Raju and Srinivasan 1996;
Kalra, Shi, and Srinivasan 2003; Lim, Ahearne, and Ham 2009; Simester and Zhang 2014).
11In a recent paper, Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2013) explore the optimal funding of experiments when the experimenter
can divert funds for his private use (similar to Bergemann and Hege 2005). The principal cannot commit to a deadline;
it manages the dynamic agency cost by delaying the pace of experimentation.
12The main model does not differentiate between internal and external agents. We also assume that workforce
turnover is sufficiently costly, so that the firm retains the same agent throughout the project. We will discuss these
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For example, if the goal is to develop a new product that meets seasonal demand, development work
must finish by the end of the season. A two-period model suffices to illustrate the mechanism of
interest, although the same intuition applies to a model of longer horizons.13
In period t, where t ∈ {1, 2}, the outcome of the project is either success (dt = 1) or the lack
thereof (dt = 0), which is observed by both the firm and the agent. Once success is achieved, the
firm receives a lump-sum yield Y > 0 and closes the project. A hard deadline (thereafter refereed to
as deadline for brevity) in this context is defined as the commitment to terminating the project at
the end of period one regardless of its development outcome. We will focus on the nontrivial case in
which the deadline is premature – we will make parameter assumptions to ensure that the project
is worth continuing into period two even if it has not succeeded in period one. The firm makes the
deadline decision at the beginning of the game. The agent observes this decision.
We assume that the firm is able to credibly commit to a hard deadline (see also Bonatti and
Ho¨rner 2011; Campbell, Ederer, and Spinnewijn 2014). Without such commitment power, the firm
will want to extend the project past deadline given the aforementioned assumption about positive
project continuation value, which renders the deadline a soft one that is never strictly enforced.
Commitment can happen through various channels in practice. For example, the majority of today’s
companies use the Stage-Gater system to organize the new product development process (Schmidt,
Sarangee and Montoya 2009). Stages comprise development activities. Gates are checkpoints where
the company evaluates projects and cancels those that fail to meet expectations. Each gate, often
predetermined, serves as the deadline of the preceding stage.14 For instance, the LEGO Group
schedules specific calendar dates for its development gates (Robertson and Crawford 2008). These
dates are published in company guidelines and are laborious to revise. In addition, product releases
require complex coordination within a company and beyond. Postponing a project’s deadline often
causes tension with collaborators and customers. For instance, during Adobe’s release of Creative
issues in Section 4.4.
13We could in theory consider an infinite-horizon model. However, as we will discuss, beliefs about project viability
decline over time as the agent works without achieving success. For any positive cost of effort, there exists an efficient
project termination period t∗, beyond which the cost of effort outweighs the expected yield from the project and the
beliefs about project viability can never improve. Therefore, we are essentially studying a finite-horizon problem, where
the question becomes whether the firm will want to impose a deadline that occurs before time t∗.
14In other words, we can think of project development described in this model as corresponding to a stage, and think
of each period of the model as corresponding to a “sub-stage” (e.g., Ajam 2014). Typical stages include opportunity
identification, preliminary marketing and technical assessment, development and testing, and commercialization (e.g.,
Schmidt, Sarangee and Montoya 2009). The development and testing stage best describes the product development
activities studied in this paper, although the same idea applies to other stages. Also, the model can be extended to
capture the entire Stage-Gate process, in which prior beliefs of product viability and the productivity of effort can
vary across stages.
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Suite 3, the developer of Device Central was warned that this component was behind schedule and
would be pulled from the launch (Thomas and Barley 2008). To the extent that it is sufficiently
costly to miss a deadline, the deadline is credible.
The chance of success depends on two factors: the effort from the agent and the nature of the
project. To simplify, we assume that the agent can choose to either work (et = 1) or shirk (et = 0)
in each period, and the project can be either viable or unviable. If the agent shirks or if the project
is unviable, the probability of success in that period is zero; if the agent works and if the project is
viable, the probability of success is a ∈ (0, 1). A larger a represents higher productivity of effort.
For the main model we assume that the agent’s product development effort is non-cumulative across
periods. We will extend the analysis to allow for cumulative effort in Section 5.2.
If the agent works, he incurs a per-period cost of C > 0. Whether the agent works is unobserved
by the firm, which creates the standard moral hazard problem. To motivate the agent to work, the
firm must pay the agent a reward if success is achieved. The main model focuses on short-term
contracting, whereby in period t the firm pays the agent a reward Rt if success is achieved in this
period. The focus on short-term contracts accommodates the possibility that the firm and the agent
can renegotiate the wage contract during the product development process. (Section 5.1 shows that
the firm cannot improve profits by committing to a long-term contract.) The agent enjoys an outside
utility of zero, and holds limited liability to the firm (Simester and Zhang 2010). Therefore, in period
t the firm will optimally pay the agent a wage normalized to zero if success is not achieved.
The firm and the agent share the common prior belief that the project is viable with probability
µ0 ∈ (0, 1). Practically, this assumption suits the development of new products about which neither
the firm nor the agent has superior prior knowledge. Theoretically, it is a conservative assumption
for this model because any (off-equilibrium) divergence of beliefs between the firm and the agent
can only arise endogenously.15
As the project progresses, beliefs about project viability evolve. In particular, at the end of each
period, the firm and the agent commonly observe whether success has been achieved. The agent
privately observes his effort, and is able to form the correct belief about project viability. The firm
does not observe the agent’s effort, and must form its belief about project viability based on its
belief about the agent’s effort decision (to be developed in Section 4.2).
15See Desai and Srinivasan (1995) and Simester and Zhang (2010) for analyses of situations where moral hazard
interacts with exogenous information asymmetry.
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Both the firm and the agent are risk-neutral. Let Π denote the firm’s expected discounted profit
at the beginning of period one, and similarly let U denote the agent’s expected discounted utility.
The firm and the agent’s discount factors are δF and δA respectively, where 0 < δF , δA < 1. We
allow these two discount factors to differ in order to identify their separate effects on the equilibrium.
Table 1 summarizes the key notations of this paper. All parameter values are commonly observed
by the firm and the agent.
Table 1: Summary of Notations
Notation Definition
Parameters
a Probability of success if the project is viable and if the agent works, a ∈ (0, 1)
C Agent’s cost of effort, C > 0
δA Agent’s discount factor, δA ∈ (0, 1)
δF Firm’s discount factor, δF ∈ (0, 1)
µ0 Prior belief (i.e., perceived probability) that the project is viable, µ0 ∈ (0, 1)
Y Firm’s yield from success, Y > 0
Variables
dt Indicator of whether success arrives in period t
et Indicator of whether the agent incurs effort in period t
µt Belief (i.e., perceived probability) at the end of period t that the project is viable
p Firm’s belief (i.e., perceived probability) that the agent has worked in period one
if project has failed in period one
Π Firm’s expected discounted profit
Rt Agent’s reward in period t if success is achieved in this period
U Agent’s expected discounted utility
VA Net present value of successive projects to the agent (Section 5.3)
VF Net present value of successive projects to the firm (Section 5.3)
The full sequence of moves unfolds as follows.
1. At the beginning of period one, the firm decides whether to impose a deadline. The agent
observes this decision.
2. The firm sets the reward R1.
3. Observing the firm’s reward offer R1, the agent determines his effort level e1.
4. If success is achieved in period one, the game ends. The firm receives its return Y and the
agent receives reward R1. If success is not achieved and the firm has imposed a deadline, the
game ends. The firm and the agent both receive zero payoff. If success is not achieved and the
firm has not imposed a deadline, the game continues into period two, which involves steps 5
through 7.
5. The firm sets the reward R2.
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6. Observing the firm’s reward offer R2, the agent determines his effort level e2.
7. If success is achieved in period two, the firm receives its return Y and the agent receives his
reward R2. If success is not achieved, the firm and the agent both receive zero payoff. The
game ends.
3.2 Equilibrium Concept
We derive the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this dynamic game of imperfect information (Fu-
denberg and Tirole 1991). A perfect Bayesian equilibrium contains each player’s strategy and each
player’s belief at each information set where the player has the move. Each strategy must be optimal
given the player’s belief at that information set and the other players’ subsequent strategies. Beliefs
on the equilibrium path are determined by Bayes’ rule and equilibrium strategies. Moreover, beliefs
off the equilibrium path are also determined by Bayes’ rule and equilibrium strategies whenever
applicable. The last requirement ensures that strictly dominated strategies off the equilibrium path
are not credible threats.
The firm’s strategy profile contains its deadline decision and the reward offer for each period. The
agent’s strategy profile contains his effort decision in each period. The only non-singleton information
set is the firm’s information set when it gets to choose the reward R2; the firm believes that the agent
has worked in period one with probability p ∈ [0, 1] and has shirked with probability 1−p. Therefore,
for the subgame where the firm imposes a deadline, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium simply coincides
with the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. For the subgame where the firm does not impose a
deadline, however, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium depends on the firm’s off-equilibrium belief of
the agent’s effort in period one, which we will analyze in Section 4.2.
3.3 Evolution of Beliefs about Project Viability
We begin the analysis by describing the firm and the agent’s posterior beliefs about project viability.
If success is achieved in period t ∈ {1, 2}, the project is trivially proven to be viable, hence µt = 1. If
success is not achieved, the posterior belief about the project’s viability is updated following Bayes’
rule, depending on whether the agent is believed to have worked during period t. For example, if
the agent is believed to have worked in period t, then µt(dt = 0, et = 1) = Pr(viable|dt = 0, et =
1) = Pr(dt=0|viable,et=1) Pr(viable)Pr(dt=0|viable,et=1) Pr(viable)+Pr(dt=0|unviable,et=1) Pr(unviable) =
(1−a)µt−1
(1−a)µt−1+(1−µt−1) =
(1−a)µt−1
1−µt−1a . The
posterior belief if the agent is believed to have shirked can be similarly derived. In particular, the
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updating of beliefs at the end of the first period is as follows:
µ1(d1, e1) =

1 if d1 = 1,
µ0 if d1 = 0 and e1 = 0,
(1−a)µ0
1−µ0a if d1 = 0 and e1 = 1.
(1)
Intuitively, failure conveys no information about the project’s viability if the agent has shirked,
because shirking alone renders success impossible. In contrast, failure in spite of effort raises doubt
about the project’s viability.
It is important to note that posterior beliefs about project viability, as specified above, depend
on the perceived effort input. The agent privately observes his effort decision, and is thus able to
formulate the correct beliefs about project viability. On the other hand, the firm’s beliefs about
project viability depend on its beliefs about the agent’s effort decision. In particular, when there
is no deadline and the project has yielded no success by the end of period one, the firm’s belief
about project viability depends on whether the lack of success is due to the agent’s lack of effort or
simply bad luck. If the firm believes that the agent has shirked, its belief about project viability
remains as µ0. If the firm believes that the agent has worked without success, its belief about project
viability deteriorates to µ1(d1 = 0, e1 = 1). For notational simplicity, we write this belief as µ
w
1 (w
for “work”):
µw1 =
(1− a)µ0
1− µ0a
< µ0. (2)
3.4 First-Best Project Termination Decision
Before we derive the firm’s optimal deadline decision, it is useful to establish the first-best project
termination decision as a benchmark. We assume that the agent works for his own product devel-
opment project, which eliminates the agency problem. The agent observes his own effort input and
forms the correct beliefs about project viability. Since beliefs weakly deteriorate over time with the
lack of success, if the prior belief µ0 is already too pessimistic, the project is not worth starting
in the first place. Specifically, if µ0aY ≤ C, then the agent will trivially make no profit from the
project. We define the following threshold of beliefs:
µˆ =
C
aY
. (3)
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We will focus on the non-degenerate parameter space in which µ0 > µˆ, such that it is efficient for
the project to last for at least one period.
Note that the agent will want to work in the first period. He gains no payoff from the project
and learns no information about the project’s viability by shirking. If success has not arrived at the
end of the first period, the agent updates his belief about project viability to µw1 , knowing that effort
has been incurred in vain. If µw1 ≤ µˆ, then the updated belief is so pessimistic that the project is
not worth continuing into period two. The more interesting case is the decision to impose a deadline
at the end of period one even if the project has positive continuation value for period two. Hence
for the rest of the analysis we will restrict attention to the parameter space satisfying the following
assumption.
Assumption. It is efficient for the project to continue into period two even if the agent has worked
without success in period one:
µw1 > µˆ. (4)
In other words, the project is sufficiently promising that it is not only worth pursuing, but also
worth two periods of effort in the first-best scenario. The question is why firms, back in the principle-
agent framework, would commit to an inefficient, premature deadline at the end of period one. We
turn to this question next.
4 Firm’s Deadline Decision
The firm’s optimal deadline decision depends on its expected profit with versus without a deadline.
We analyze these two subgames in order. This analysis yields conditions under which the firm should
impose a deadline. We will discuss these findings in light of product development practice at the
end of this section.
4.1 With a Deadline
Imposing a deadline reduces the interactions between the firm and agent to a simple one-period
game. The firm offers reward R1 and the agent in turn chooses whether to work. If the agent shirks,
he derives no utility and the firm earns no profit in this period. If the agent works, he earns an
expected utility of µ0aR1 − C, and the firm earns an expected profit of µ0a(Y − R1). Therefore,
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when there is a deadline the optimal reward to induce the agent to work is16
Rd1 =
C
µ0a
. (5)
We use the superscript d to denote optimal values in the subgame with a deadline. Similarly, we
will use nd to denote optimal values in the subgame without a deadline.
With reward offer Rd1 the firm earns an expected profit of µ0aY − C by inducing the agent to
work. This profit is positive by assumption. As a result, when there is a deadline the firm will indeed
choose to motivate effort. In doing so, the firm earns an expected discounted profit of
Πd = µ0aY − C. (6)
The firm allows the project only one period of effort, and extracts the entire expected surplus
associated with this effort without overcompensating the agent. However, by imposing a deadline
the firm also forfeits a positive continuation value left in the project. By Condition (4), the deadline
is premature because the project is still worth continuing at the end of the first period. Why, then,
would the firm impose a deadline? We explore this issue next by examining the distortions that
arise in the absence of a deadline.
4.2 Without a Deadline
Without a deadline, the interactions between the firm and the agent are more complex. What drives
the complexity is the fact that the firm cannot observe the agent’s effort in a dynamic setting. When
the project reaches the end of the first period without success, the firm does not observe whether
this is because the agent has worked without luck or has simply shirked. The firm forms its belief
about the agent’s effort decision in period one. This belief determines the firm’s reward offer – and
the agent’s payoff – in period two. The anticipation of his period-two payoff affects the agent’s effort
decision in period one. The agent’s effort decision in period one, in turn, needs to be Bayesian-
consistent with the firm’s belief about this effort in equilibrium. In addition, a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium requires that the agent’s effort decision in period one also be Bayesian-consistent with
the firm’s belief off equilibrium, whenever applicable. This is a useful refinement. Specifically, it
16In practice the firm can offer a reward infinitesimally higher than Rd1 to ensure that the agent strictly prefers to
work. The same is true for all reward offers in the rest of the paper.
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permits a credible portrait of the possible outcomes following any period-one reward offer. After
all, in order to establish the optimal period-one reward (the firm gains nothing from randomizing
this reward), we need to know what might happen following other possible rewards (i.e., the off
equilibrium path). We derive all perfect Bayesian equilibria of the subgame without a deadline and
establish the following result (see the Appendix for proof):
Lemma 1. Without a deadline, to ensure that the agent works in period one, the firm must offer a
reward that overcompensates the agent for his cost of effort:
Rnd1 =
C
µ0a
[
1 + δA
(
µ0
µw1
− 1
)]
> Rd1. (7)
The intuition is as follows. Since the agent can choose either to work or to shirk in period one,
in the lack of success the agent’s correct belief about project viability at the end of period one is
either µw1 or µ0, respectively. When period two comes, the firm thus chooses between offering a
big reward Cµw1 a
to motivate a more pessimistic agent with belief µw1 to work, and offering a small
reward Cµ0a
to motivate a less pessimistic agent of belief µ0. The firm will choose the big reward if
it believes that the agent is more likely to have worked in period one (p > pˆ, where pˆ is derived in
the Appendix) and a small reward if it believes the agent is more likely to have shirked (p < pˆ).
The firm’s period-two reward offer, denoted by R2(p), is thus an increasing step function of its belief
about the agent’s period-one effort.
The agent understands the firm’s thinking when he chooses whether to work in period one. If
he chooses to work, he will earn a utility of zero in period two regardless of the firm’s belief; the
best he can receive is the big reward, which is just enough to make him want to work in period two.
Therefore, for any firm belief p, the agent’s expected discounted utility from working in period one
is
U(e1 = 1;R1, p) = µ0aR1 − C.
On the other hand, if the agent shirks in period one, he will be willing to work in period two at
either reward offer. Importantly, his expected discounted utility will depend on the firm’s belief p:
U(e1 = 0;R1, p) = δA[µ0aR2(p)− C],
where R2(p) captures the aforementioned effect of the firm’s belief p on its period-two reward offer.
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The firm in turn understands the agent’s thinking. By offering a sufficiently large reward of Rnd1 ,
the firm ensures that the agent will work in period one for all possible beliefs the firm might hold,
including the equilibrium belief that the agent will indeed work in period one (p = 1). This reward
overcompensates the agent for his cost of effort in the first period:
U(e1 = 1;R
nd
1 , p) = δA
(
µ0
µw1
− 1
)
C > 0. (8)
We refer to the term δA(
µ0
µw1
− 1)C as a dynamic rent enjoyed by the agent. This dynamic rent
reflects a combination of moral hazard and asymmetric information – by privately shirking in period
one, the agent gains an information rent in period two from his more accurate inference of project
viability. As long as the firm believes that the agent is sufficiently likely to have worked in period
one, it will offer a generous reward in period two to motivate this likely-pessimistic agent. However,
the agent knows that the lack of success is attributed to his lack of effort, and therefore maintains
the private, more optimistic belief about the project. The combination of a generous reward and
a disproportionately optimistic chance to earn this reward leads to a dynamic rent in period two.
This dynamic effect accentuates the moral hazard problem in period one as the firm must pay more
than the cost of effort to induce the agent to work.17
Bergemann and Hege (2005) also study the issue of dynamic moral hazard but derive an opposite
result. In their case, an entrepreneur (the agent) makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to attract funding
from an investor (the principal). If the entrepreneur deviates and diverts funding to his personal
use, the unsuspecting investor will think that success has not arrived in spite of proper use of
funding. This pessimistic investor will thus demand a greater share in the project to be willing to
continue funding, which makes deviation less attractive to the entrepreneur. In other words, the
entrepreneur’s dynamic incentives help discipline his fund usage in Bergemann and Hege (2005),
whereas the agent’s dynamic incentives exacerbate his moral hazard problem in our paper.
Since the firm incurs a dynamic rent, the question is whether the firm can do better by offering
17The mere fact that large rewards are required to motivate a pessimistic agent is insufficient to generate the dynamic
rent. For the dynamic rent to arise, the agent also needs to have better information about how pessimistic he is. This
happens as the firm and the agent attribute the lack of success to project viability versus effort in different ways. The
agent’s private knowledge of his effort allows him to make more accurate attribution. In a related paper, Miklo´s-Thal
and Zhang (2013) study the implications of attribution in firm-consumer interactions. To the extent that consumers
attribute product sales to marketing push versus product quality, firms may benefit from conspicuously toning down
their marketing intensity. The idea of attribution extends to signal jamming models in which hidden actions are taken
to influence observable outcomes. For example, firms can make hidden investment in enhancing buyers’ shopping
experience (Iyer and Kuksov 2010), or offer unexpected frill in exchange for favorable customer ratings (Kuksov and
Xie 2010). In equilibrium, however, consumers may still draw rational attribution of their quality perception to true
product quality versus firms’ hidden efforts.
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a smaller reward in period one. An obvious option is to offer a sufficiently low reward R1 <
C
µ0a
. In
this case, if the agent works in period one, he will incur a net loss in this period because the reward
is not even sufficient to cover his cost of effort. Moreover, he will earn a utility of zero in period two
because the best he can receive is the big reward, which is just enough to cover his cost of effort
in period two. Therefore, the agent will shirk in period one for all possible beliefs the firm might
hold, including the belief that the agent indeed shirks in period one (p = 0). The firm essentially
postpones development for one period and gives the project only one shot of effort. This option is
strictly dominated by the firm imposing a deadline, which generates the same expected profit, only
sooner.
It remains to examine the “intermediate” range of first-period rewards R1 ∈ [ Cµ0a , R
nd
1 ). There is
no pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria in this case (see the Appendix). Intuitively, if the firm
is sufficiently confident that the agent has worked in period one (p > pˆ), it will offer a big reward in
period two. Compared with postponing effort to earn a big reward in period two, the intermediate
reward in period one is insufficient to motivate effort. The agent will then choose to shirk in period
one, which is inconsistent with the firm’s belief p > pˆ. Similarly, if the firm is sufficiently doubtful
that the agent has worked in period one, it will offer a small reward in period two and the agent
will then prefer to work in period one, contrary to the firm’s belief. Finally, when p = pˆ there
is a mixed-strategy equilibrium: the firm offers R1 = R2 =
C
µ0a
, the agent randomizes between
working and shirking in period one, and will work in period two if and only if he shirks in period
one. However, this is equivalent to exerting only one shot of effort at the project, with probabilistic
delay into period two. The firm can again do better by imposing a deadline.
These results suggest that any firm strategy that does not impose a deadline but offer a period-
one reward other than Rnd1 is off the equilibrium path. We state this finding below (see the Appendix
for proof).
Lemma 2. Whenever the firm prefers not to impose a deadline, it will offer Rnd1 to ensure effort in
period one.
It follows from Lemma 2 that, whenever the firm prefers not to impose a deadline, it will offer
a period-two reward big enough to motivate a pessimistic agent who worked in period one without
success:
Rnd2 =
C
µw1 a
. (9)
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The agent will work in both periods, and the firm will earn an expected discounted profit of
Πnd = µ0aY − C︸ ︷︷ ︸
Πd
− δA
(
µ0
µw1
− 1
)
C︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dynamic rent
+(1− µ0a)δF (µw1 aY − C)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Continuation value
. (10)
Comparing Πnd with Πd, we can see the costs and benefits of deadlines. By imposing a deadline, the
firm loses the chance to earn a positive project continuation value in period two, but avoids paying
the agent a dynamic rent in period one. Trading off these two factors determines whether the firm
should impose a deadline. We turn to this comparison next.
4.3 When Should a Firm Impose a Deadline
In deciding whether to impose a deadline, the firm only needs to compare Πd and Πnd. Comparative
statics of the relative value of the deadline (Πd −Πnd) reveal the following results.
If success is more valuable to the firm (higher Y ), deadlines will be more wasteful. If effort is
more costly to the agent (higher C), deadlines will help the firm save on a greater amount of reward
payment. If the firm is more patient (higher δF ), the continuation value of the project will loom
more important than the payroll savings in period one, making deadlines less attractive. If the agent
is more patient (higher δA), he will demand a higher dynamic rent, which makes deadlines a better
choice for the firm. These results are intuitive.
The effect of the prior belief (µ0) is more subtle. A more pessimistic prior belief directly lowers
the continuation value of the project. In addition, it also increases the dynamic rent paid to the agent
if the firm does not impose a deadline. This is because, when the prior belief is already pessimistic,
the lack of success is an especially bleak sign of project viability, and the firm will have to pay a
steep reward to motivate effort in period two, which in turn means the firm must pay a prohibitive
dynamic rent in period one to prevent the agent from procrastinating. It is in the firm’s best interest
to impose a deadline in this case.
Last, when effort is productive (large a), it might appear that the project is worth continuing.
However, the more productive the effort, the stronger the lack of success as a sign of low product
viability (lower µw1 ). This pessimistic belief again implies expensive reward offers in both periods
unless the firm imposes a deadline. Therefore, counterintuitive as it sounds, the firm may find
deadlines more profitable when effort is more productive. The following proposition summarizes the
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comparative statics results (see the Appendix for proof).
Proposition 1. The relative value of deadlines decreases with the firm’s yield from success (Y ) and
degree of patience (δF ); increases with the agent’s cost of effort (C) and degree of patience (δA);
decreases with the prior belief that the project is viable (µ0); and increases with the productivity of
effort (a) when effort is sufficiently productive.
Finally, we prove the existence of the equilibrium in which the firm chooses to impose a deadline.
One example suffices, and we present such an example in Figure 1. Since the relative value of
deadlines decreases with firm patience, the figure conservatively sets δF → 1. For completeness, the
figure includes the degenerate area in which the prior belief about project viability is so poor that
the project was never worth starting (µ0 ≤ µˆ), and the area in which the prior belief is better but
not great so that it is efficient to terminate the product at the end of the first period (µw1 ≤ µˆ < µ0).
These are the areas ruled out by Condition (4).
With better prior beliefs, the project has positive continuation value for the second period (µw1 >
µˆ). However, there exists a parameter range in which imposing a deadline turns out to be the
optimal firm strategy. This parameter range grows with the agent’s discount factor, consistent
with Proposition 1. Note that the firm may adopt a deadline even though its own discount factor
approaches 1. In other words, a firm’s seemingly impatient use of deadlines is not a mere reflection
of time discounting, but a result of trading off product development returns with payroll costs. The
following proposition states this result formally (proof holds by construction).
Proposition 2. There exist parameter values under which it is more profitable for a firm to impose
a deadline even though the project is worth continuing past the deadline.
4.4 Discussion
So far we have presented an agency-theoretic model of deadlines in product development. The
analysis yields conditions under which deadlines benefit firms and explains why deadlines can be
beneficial. Understanding the mechanism of deadlines also sheds light on alternative ways to manage
product development efforts in place of deadlines. We discuss these findings in this section.
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Figure 1: A Patient Firm’s Equilibrium Deadline Decision
Not Impose a Deadline:
Project Lasts Two Periods(μ1w>μ)
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Notes. This figure sets parameters values to: δF → 1, Y/C = 10, a = 0.75.
4.4.1 Internal versus External Agents
More and more companies have been outsourcing new product development responsibilities to ex-
ternal agents (Raassens, Wuyts Geyskens 2012). This is not surprising as outsourcing brings in
additional labor, fresh ideas, and new expertise (Kahn 2012). Some companies also believe that
outsourcing saves on labor costs (Marion and Friar 2012), which in our model would mean less
need for deadlines. But there is a countervailing effect. Physical separation makes it difficult for
companies to witness external developers’ daily activities and prevent potential “opportunist behav-
iors” (Williamson 2008). In the context of our model, the inability to observe the agent’s effort is
the source of inefficiency – it allows the agent to form better inference about project viability and
extract an information rent. If effort is observable, the firm will be able to restore the first-best
project termination decision. For internal employees, monitoring technologies can in fact serve as a
substitute for deadlines (see also Holmstro¨m 1979). The same level of monitoring is hardly applicable
to external agents, which escalates payroll costs unless the firm imposes deadlines. Indeed, a survey
by Deloitte Consulting (2005) indicates that 44 percent of participating companies “did not see cost
savings materializing” from outsourcing, and that 62 percent found that outsourcing required more
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management efforts than expected. This fact highlights the importance of using deadlines to man-
age external development efforts, although outsourcing is traditionally associated with relinquishing
control.
4.4.2 Core versus Ancillary Products
Imposing deadlines would be too wasteful if the firm has a lot to gain from successful product
development, which may come from the high commercial value of an invention, first-mover advantage
in a new product category, or the image of an innovative and dependable brand. To the point that
core products are more likely to serve these central values than ancillary products, we would expect
firms to impose deadlines less often for core products, or set nominal soft deadlines such that core
product development continues after its due date. An example is Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner (Healy
2009). Development underwent numerous delays. When the first Dreamliner was delivered to All
Nippon Airways in 2011, it was more than three years behind schedule. The core significance of this
new aircraft to Boeing makes it unrealistic to implement a hard deadline.
4.4.3 Hire Short-Term Developers
Besides monitoring, another alternative to deadlines is to hire product development personnel on
a short-term basis. Even if the agent recruited for the late stage of development observes the
unsuccessful past of the project and requires a large reward, this reward does not undermine the
work incentive of the agent hired for the early stage. In other words, the value of restaffing is not to
conceal pessimism, but to prevent the agent from gaming this pessimism to obtain a dynamic rent.
Indeed, Marion and Friar (2012) find that hiring contract employees on a short-term basis reduces
monthly cash drain compared with hiring full-time employees. The downside is that labor turnover
is often costly (e.g., Bentolila and Bertola 1990). Companies should then weigh the savings in payroll
costs against the restaffing cost. Recall that the dynamic rent increases with the productivity of the
agent – failure in spite of productive effort is a particularly alarming signal about project viability,
which means the firm must provide a significant reward to motivate continued effort. The prospect
of earning this dynamic rent weakens effort incentives during early development, especially when the
agent is forward-looking. As a result, counterintuitive as it sounds, companies may want to accelerate
workforce turnover if the workforce is more productive and more long-term oriented, characteristics
that are conventionally associated with employees who are worth retaining.
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5 Extensions
We have presented the key mechanism underlying the effect of deadlines in the main model. In this
section, we will relax a set of assumptions made in the main analysis. In doing so, we ask whether
alternative market features present the firm with new challenges and new opportunities in managing
product development efforts.
5.1 Long-Term Contracts
The main model assumes that the firm offers short-term contracts. These contracts are time-
consistent and renegotiation-proof (see also Bergemann and Hege 2005). It remains to explore
whether the firm could do better by committing to a long-term contract at the onset of product
development. In the context of the two-period model, this long-term contract consists of a reward
pair (Rl1, R
l
2) if success is achieved in period one or two, respectively (l for “long-term”). If success
is not achieved, the optimal reward continues to be zero. The perfect Bayesian equilibrium in this
case coincides with the subgame-perfect equilibrium.18
If the firm intends to induce only one shot of effort, it would prefer effort to occur in period
one; otherwise it gains no return from the project in period one and learns nothing new about it.
It follows that the optimal long-term contract is (Rl1 =
C
µ0a
, Rl2 <
C
µ0a
), which achieves equivalent
outcomes as short-term contracting with a deadline.
It remains to examine the scenario in which the firm intends to motivate effort over both periods.
If the agent has worked in period one without achieving success, to motivate effort in period two
the firm must ensure that Rl2 ≥ Cµw1 a = R
nd
2 . But R
nd
2 is the optimal short-term reward that induces
the agent to work in period two after failing in period one; regardless of the contract horizon, the
firm must offer a large reward to motivate a genuinely pessimistic agent to exert effort in period
two. Now consider the agent’s decision in period one. He earns a discounted expected utility of
µ0aR
l
1 − C + δA(1 − µ0a)(µw1 aRl2 − C) if he works, and δA(µ0aRl2 − C) if he shirks. A higher Rl2
increases the relative utility of shirking and makes effort more expensive to induce in period one. It
follows that the firm will minimize Rl2 as long as it is sufficient to induce effort in period two. The
18Since the firm commits to the long-term contract, a flexible reward pair weakly dominates a constant reward that
is paid upon success. Meanwhile, imposing a deadline can be seen as a long-term contract where the firm commits to
paying Rl2 = 0.
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optimal long-term contract is thus derived as
(
Rl1 = R
nd
1 , R
l
2 = R
nd
2
)
. (11)
The optimal long-term contract to induce two periods of effort coincides with the optimal short-
term contract in the absence of a deadline. The intuition is as follows. A long-term contract benefits
the firm if it makes effort less expensive to induce by reallocating the agent’s rents over time. In the
case of short-term contracts without a deadline, the agent earns no rents in period two but a positive
dynamic rent in period one. The only reallocation a long-term contract could achieve in this case –
while maintaining effort incentive in period two – is to allocate more rent for period two, but that
only serves to exacerbate the agent’s procrastination tendency. Therefore, the firm cannot improve
profits through long-term contracts in this setting. We summarize this result with the following
proposition (proof holds by construction).
Proposition 3. Optimal short-term and long-term contracts generate identical outcomes for the
product development setting analyzed in this paper.
Comparing Rl1 and R
l
2 suggests that the agent receivers a larger bonus if he achieves success later.
This finding is counterintuitive because companies would normally want to reward early success and
penalize late completion.19 The reason is that the agent, having worked in period one to no avail, feels
more pessimistic about the project in period two and needs greater incentives to be willing to work.
This result echoes real-world observations where companies have to increase budgets to maintain
development efforts on (nearly) failing projects. RCA kept escalating investment into SelectaVision
over a prolonged development of 14 years. When the product was finally terminated, it had cost the
company $580 million (Royer 2003). Ford’s Edsel, having posted a loss of $250 million, continued
for another two and half years, at an additional cost of $200 million. A strict deadline might have
alleviated these costs.
5.2 Cumulative Effort
In some product categories, the agent’s effort becomes more productive as product development
progresses. To capture this effect, we extend the main model by assuming that, if the project is
19The firm can commit to a reward for early completion. Given the limited liability constraint, the firm can
also commit to a “penalty” for late completion in the form of a small, nonnegative payment. By definition, these
arrangements are weakly dominated by the optimal long-term contract.
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viable, the chance of success is a on the agent’s first trial and is a′ > a on his second. That is, the
agent will enjoy a higher productivity of a′ in period two if and only if he has worked in period one.
The value of a′ is common knowledge.
The cumulative nature of effort makes deadlines less valuable to the firm. With a deadline, the
firm earns Πd, the same expected total profit as in the main model; without a deadline, it earns a
higher expected total profit than Πnd for two reasons. First, the continuation value for the second
period, µw1 a
′Y − C, is higher than if effort were noncumulative. Second, the dynamic rent is lower.
To see the latter effect, note that the optimal reward to induce a second period of effort is Cµw1 a′
.
This reward is lower than Rnd2 of the main model because the agent is now more productive. The
reduction in period-two reward dampens the agent’s shirking incentive in period one. Moreover,
shirking in period one prevents the agent from growing his productivity, which limits his chance of
earning the reward in period two. Indeed, following the logic of the main model, we can derive the
the agent’s dynamic rent as
δA max
[
0,
(
µ0a
µw1 a
′ − 1
)
C
]
. (12)
This dynamic rent is lower than its counterpart in the main model since a′ > a. The firm as a result
earns a higher expected total profit by abandoning the deadline. The following proposition states
the result (proof holds by construction).
Proposition 4. The value of deadlines decreases if product development effort is cumulative.
This result expands the paper’s managerial recommendations regarding the applicability of dead-
lines. Product development effort can carry over to the future for various reasons. First, product
development may involve learning-by-doing in some industries, such as software development. Also,
when the product is new to the market or the development staff new to the product, development
proficiency grows through experience. Second, when there are a relatively small number of product
development options, identifying the poor options increases the chance of finding the right solution
(if there is one). For example, the Stage-Gate model of product development screens ideas succes-
sively down the development funnel, such that there are fewer development options in later stages
than in earlier stages. Proposition 4 implies that, other things being equal, companies may want to
enforce hard deadlines in earlier stages of development and allow for a more lenient schedule in later
stages. Along the same line of reasoning, in product categories where development has to navigate
a large set of possible options – the pharmaceutical industry being a good example – eliminating
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poor options does not significantly improve the odds of success. Deadlines will be worth considering
in these categories. Indeed, pharmaceutical companies face the decision to kill drugs with further
investigative potential almost on a daily basis, even going as far as developing the Quick-Kill model
to ensure that projects are being frequently eliminated.
5.3 Successive Products
In the main model, the game ends once product development yields success. In practice, however,
the firm may be able to start another product upon finishing. This creates an opportunity cost of
time for both the firm and the agent. The firm may have the extra incentive to impose a deadline
and move fast. At the same time, the opportunity to work on future products induces the agent to
finish the current project earlier, an “intrinsic motivation” that makes deadlines less necessary.
To examine these effects, we extend the main model into an infinite horizon. Each product
development project can again last at most two periods for exogenous reasons such as seasonality of
demand. However, the firm can assign the agent to a new project once the current project succeeds,
hits the deadline, or exhausts its two-period development window. By the same argument of the
main model, the firm will prefer the agent to embark on the new project without further delay.20
We focus on the steady state in which the stream of projects are ex ante identical and the firm
maintains the same deadline policy among these projects.
Let VA and VF be the steady-state net present value of the stream of successive projects to the
agent and the firm, respectively. The availability of future projects does not change the agent’s work
incentives if the firm imposes a deadline. If he works, he earns an expected utility of µ0aR¯1−C+δAV dA ,
where we use the upper bar to denote reward offers in this extension. If he shirks, he earns δAV
d
A . In
both cases, the agent knows that regardless of development outcome he will start on a new project
in the following period and earn a discounted net present value of δAV
d
A , where d again denotes
optimal values if the firm imposes a deadline. The firm’s optimal reward offer is thus R¯d1 =
C
µ0a
,
which is the same as in the main model. The agent earns an expected surplus of zero from each
project, which leads to a net present value of V dA = 0. This is consistent with the result of the main
model that deadlines help the firm eliminate the agent’s dynamic rent. The firm as a result captures
a net present value of V dF =
µ0aY−C
1−δF .
20The firm could motivate effort by, for example, threatening to delay the new project if the current project finishes
in failure. However, such arrangements are not time-consistent.
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If the firm does not impose a deadline, how does the availability of future projects change the
agent’s work incentives? The dynamic rent again arises, because the agent’s private information
about his effort input leads to better inference about project viability. However, the prospect of
earning a dynamic rent on future projects motivates the agent to finish sooner, which serves to
mitigate the dynamic rent on the current project.
Following the logic of the main model, we can show that the firm will offer a big reward Cµw1 a
in
period two of each project if it is sufficiently confident that the agent has worked in period one; it
will offer a small reward Cµ0a
if it is sufficiently doubtful. The agent’s expected discounted utility
from working in period one is
U(e1 = 1; R¯1, p) = µ0a(R¯1 + δAV
nd
A )− C + (1− µ0a)δ2AV ndA .
He knows that, if he works in period one, he will succeed and start on a new project in period two
with probability µ0a; he will continue working on the same project in period two and begin a new
one in period three with probability 1 − µ0a. The discounted net present values of future projects
are δAV
nd
A and δ
2
AV
nd
A for these two scenarios, respectively, where nd denotes optimal values without
deadlines. Similarly, the agent’s expected discounted utility from shirking in period one is
U(e1 = 0; R¯1, p) = δA[µ0aR¯2(p)− C + δAV ndA ].
Again, whenever the firm prefers not to impose a deadline, it should offer a sufficiently generous
reward R¯nd1 in period one to ensure effort. The agent’s expected discounted utility given this reward
in turn equals his steady-state net present value of incoming projects, such that U(e1 = 1; R¯
nd
1 , p) =
U(e1 = 0; R¯
nd
1 , p = 1) = V
nd
A . From this system of equations we derive the agent’s net present value
of successive projects as
V ndA =
δA
1− δ2A
(
µ0
µw1
− 1
)
C > 0. (13)
This net present value is positive because of the dynamic rent. However, the prospect of accelerating
future projects motivates the agent to work in period one of each project at a lower reward than in
the main model:
R¯nd1 = R
nd
1 −
δ2A
1 + δA
(
µ0
µw1
− 1
)
C < Rnd1 . (14)
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The firm will motivate effort in period two of each project by offering R¯nd2 =
C
µw1 a
= Rnd2 . These
reward choices affect the firm’s net present value from a stream of successive products in the absence
of a deadline: V ndF . Weighing V
nd
F and V
d
F , the firm determines whether to impose a deadline. We
analyze this decision and compare it with the firm’s deadline choice in the main model. We establish
the following result (see the Appendix for proof).
Proposition 5. When there is a stream of successive product development projects, the relative value
of deadlines compared with that in the case of a stand-alone project (e.g., the main model) decreases
with the agent’s degree of patience (δA).
Recall that Proposition 1 states that the value of deadlines for stand-alone projects increases
with the agent’s degree of patience. This is because, in the absence of a deadline, a patient agent
needs to be offered a greater dynamic rent to be willing to work. The seemingly opposite result
obtained in Proposition 5 actually captures the same underlying impact of the dynamic rent on the
firm’s deadline decisions. When there is a stream of product development opportunities, a patient
agent values the option of working on future projects, which motivates him to work harder today
in the hopes of early completion. This extra motivation to work allows the firm to pay the agent a
smaller dynamic rent (we have shown that R¯nd1 < R
nd
1 ), an effect that mitigate the firm’s reliance
on deadlines to reduce its payroll costs.21
6 Concluding Remarks
Deadlines are commonly used in the product development process although many projects are still
worth continuing when the deadline hits. This paper offers an agency-theoretic account of harsh
deadlines. The explanation centers on firms’ tradeoff between the return from a project and the
labor cost of this project. As the project proceeds without success, the firm and the agent become
more pessimistic about the project’s inherent viability. The firm must sufficiently reward late success
to motivate continued development effort. However, rewarding late success in turn undermines the
agent’s effort incentive during the early stage of development. A deadline benefits the firm by
eliminating the agent’s dynamic incentives to procrastinate. Table 2 summarizes the managerial
21The effect of firm patience on the relative value of deadlines is ambiguous. The more forward-looking a firm is,
the more it values its future projects. Imposing deadlines allows the firm to expedite development. However, if the
availability of future projects saves the firm enough payoff costs, deadlines become less useful compared with the main
model. In this case, the more forward-looking a firm is, the more it has to gain from future projects without deadlines
(see the Appendix for details).
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recommendations of the paper.
Table 2: Summary of Managerial Recommendations
• Main takeaway: deadlines can improve firm profit from product development
• Deadlines are worth considering when
◦ agent’s cost of effort is high
◦ firm’s yield from success is low
◦ agent is patient
◦ firm is impatient
◦ prior belief of the project is pessimistic
◦ agent is productive
◦ effort is noncumulative
• Other strategies to consider
◦ monitor effort
◦ hire agents on a short-term basis
◦ use future projects to motivate current effort
This paper serves to highlight the impact of agency problems on product development. There are
a number of ways to extend this line of research. One direction is to explore the optimal division of
effort among a portfolio of product development projects, as well as its interaction with the design
of deadlines. Another important extension is to consider a stream of heterogeneous development
projects. It is nontrivial to decide how to schedule these projects and how much development time
to assign to each project. Last but not least, creative agents may privately observe the productivity
of their efforts. The firm’s screening incentive and the agent’s reputation concerns can both generate
interesting dynamics.
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the only non-singleton information set, the one at which the firm gets to set period-two
reward R2. The project has just failed in period one. The firm must assign a probability distribution
over this information set: it believes that the agent has worked in period one (e1 = 1) with probability
p ∈ [0, 1] and shirked (e1 = 0) with probability 1−p. This in turn determines the firm’s belief about
the agent’s private, correct belief about project viability at the end of the unsuccessful period one:
the firm believes that it is µw1 with probability p and µ0 with probability 1− p.
By working in period two, the agent earns an expected utility of µw1 aR2 − C if he worked in period
one without success and µ0aR2−C if he shirked. By shirking in period two, the agent earns a utility
of zero. It follows that in period two the firm can choose between offering a “high reward” Rh2 that
is just sufficient to motivate an agent with belief µw1 to work, and offering a “low reward” R
l
2 that
is just sufficient to motivate a more optimistic agent with belief µ0 to work:
Rh2 =
C
µw1 a
, (A1)
Rl2 =
C
µ0a
. (A2)
Any other reward levels in period two are suboptimal.
Which reward the firm will offer in period two depends on p, its belief about the agent’s effort
in period one. If the firm offers the high reward, the agent will be willing to work in period two
regardless of his belief about project viability, and the firm will earn an expected period-two profit
(denoted as Π2) of
Π2(R
h
2 ; p) = pµ
w
1 a(Y −Rh2) + (1− p)µ0a(Y −Rh2).
If the firm offers the low reward in period two, the agent will only be willing to work if he shirked
in period one, and the firm will earn an expected period-two profit of
Π2(R
l
2; p) = (1− p)µ0a(Y −Rl2).
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Equating Π2(R
h
2 ; p) with Π2(R
l
2; p) yields
pˆ =
µ0(R
h
2 −Rl2)
µw1 (Y −Rh2) + µ0(Rh2 −Rl2)
∈ (0, 1). (A3)
Comparing Π2(R
h
2 ; p) and Π2(R
l
2; p), the firm’s optimal period-two reward offer is
R2(p) =

Rh2 if p > pˆ,
Rl2 if p < pˆ,
Rh2 with prob q,R
l
2 with prob 1− q if p = pˆ,
(A4)
where q ∈ [0, 1] captures the firm’s indifference between Rh2 and Rl2 when p = pˆ.
Now consider the first period of the game. The firm offers R1 and the agents chooses e1. By working
in period one, the agent earns an expected discounted utility of
U(e1 = 1;R1, p) = µ0aR1 − C + (1− µ0a)δA max[0, µw1 aR2(p)− C].
The term max[0, µw1 aR2(p) − C] captures the agent’s option to not work in period two. However,
this term equals 0. If the agent works in period one, then in period two he either faces a low reward
and chooses to shirk, or faces a high reward and is just willing to work. In both cases, the agent
expects zero utility in period two. Therefore, the agent’s expected discounted utility from working
in period one does not depend on the firm’s belief p:
U(e1 = 1;R1, p) = µ0aR1 − C. (A5)
On the other hand, the agent’s expected discounted utility from shirking in period one is
U(e1 = 0;R1, p) = δA max[0, µ0aR2(p)− C].
The term max[0, µ0aR2(p)−C] equals µ0aR2(p)−C because, if the agent shirks in period one, he is
always willing to work in period two even at a low reward. His period-two utility depends on R2(p),
which is given in Equation (A4). Therefore, the agent’s expected discounted utility from shirking in
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period one does depend on the firm’s belief p:
U(e1 = 0;R1, p) = δA[µ0aR2(p)− C]. (A6)
Now consider the firm’s first-period reward offer R1. There are three possible cases.
I R1 ≥ Cµ0a
[
1 + δA
(
µ0
µw1
− 1
)]
.
In this case, U(e1 = 1;R1, p) ≥ U(e1 = 0;R1, p) for any p. The agent will work in period one
for certain, and the only consistent belief is p = 1. It follows that the firm will offer R2 = R
h
2
in period two. By choosing R1 in this range, the firm earns an expected discounted profit of
ΠI(R1) = µ0a(Y − R1) + (1 − µ0a)δFµw1 a(Y − Rh2). Therefore, the firm’s dominant choice of
period-one reward in this case, denoted as RI1, is
RI1 =
C
µ0a
[
1 + δA
(
µ0
µw1
− 1
)]
. (A7)
This establishes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the subgame without a deadline:
{
R1 = R
I
1, e1 = 1, R2 = R
h
2 , e2 = 1, p = 1
}
. (A8)
II R1 <
C
µ0a
.
In this case, U(e1 = 1;R1, p) < U(e1 = 0;R1, p) for any p. The agent will shirk in period one
for certain, and the only consistent belief is p = 0. It follows that the firm will offer R2 = R
l
2
in period two. This establishes a set of perfect Bayesian equilibria for the subgame without a
deadline:
{
R1 <
C
µ0a
, e1 = 0, R2 = R
l
2, e2 = 1, p = 0
}
. (A9)
III Cµ0a
≤ R1 < Cµ0a
[
1 + δA
(
µ0
µw1
− 1
)]
.
We will show that no pure-strategy equilibrium exists in this case. There are three sub-
scenarios.
• If p > pˆ, the firm will offer R2 = Rh2 . It follows that U(e1 = 1;R1, p > pˆ) < U(e1 =
0;R1, p > pˆ) because R1 <
C
µ0a
[
1 + δA
(
µ0
µw1
− 1
)]
. Therefore, the agent will shirk in
period one for certain, which is inconsistent with the belief p > pˆ.
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• If p < pˆ, the firm will offer R2 = Rl2. It follows that U(e1 = 1;R1, p < pˆ) ≥ U(e1 =
0;R1, p < pˆ) because R1 ≥ Cµ0a . Therefore, the agent will work in period one for certain,
which is inconsistent with the belief p < pˆ.
• If p = pˆ, the firm will offer R2 = Rh2 with probability q and offer R2 = Rl2 with probability
1 − q. It follows that U(e1 = 0;R1, p = pˆ) = δAq(µ0aRh2 − C). The agent’s indifference
between working and shirking in period one requires U(e1 = 1;R1, p = pˆ) = U(e1 =
0;R1, p = pˆ), which yields
q∗(R1) =
µ0aR1 − C
δA(µ0aR
h
2 − C)
.
By offering R1, the firm earns an expected discounted profit of
ΠIII(R1) = pˆ[µ0a(Y −R1) + (1− µ0a)δF q∗(R1)µw1 a(Y −Rh2)]
+(1− pˆ)δFµ0a[Y − q∗(R1)Rh2 − (1− q∗(R1))Rl2].
Rearranging terms shows that dΠ
III(R1)
dR1
< 0. Therefore, the firm’s dominant choice of
period-one reward is R1 =
C
µ0a
. It follows that q∗ = 0 so that R2 = Rl2. This establishes
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the subgame without a deadline:R1 = Cµ0a, e1 =
 1 with prob pˆ0 with prob 1− pˆ , R2 = Rl2, e2 =
 1 if e1 = 00 if e1 = 1 , p = pˆ
 .
(A10)
In summary, (A8), (A9), and (A10) are all perfect Bayesian equilibria of the subgame without a
deadline, among which (A8) is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium that ensures first-period
effort (that is, e1 = 1 with probability 1) in the subgame without a deadline. 
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
The proof of Lemma 1 identifies all perfect Bayesian equilibria of the subgame without a deadline,
given by (A8), (A9), and (A10). The firm’s corresponding expected discounted profits are
ΠI = µ0a(Y −RI1) + (1− µ0a)δFµw1 a(Y −Rh2), (A11)
ΠII = δFµ0a(Y −Rl2), (A12)
ΠIII = [pˆ+ (1− pˆ)δF ]µ0a(Y −Rl2). (A13)
The firm’s expected discounted profit from imposing a deadline is Πd, as given in Equation (6). It is
easy to see that Πd > max(ΠII ,ΠIII). If Πd > max(ΠI ,ΠII ,ΠIII), the firm will impose a deadline.
If Πd ≤ max(ΠI ,ΠII ,ΠIII), it must be that ΠI > max(ΠII ,ΠIII) so that the firm will not impose a
deadline but will choose R1 = R
I
1. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The firm prefers to impose a deadline if and only if 4 = Πd − Πnd > 0. It follows from Equations
(6) and (10) that
4 = δA
(
µ0
µw1
− 1
)
C − (1− µ0a)δF (µw1 aY − C)
= δA
a
1− a(1− µ0)C − δF [a(1− a)µ0Y − (1− µ0a)C]. (A14)
It is straightforward to verify that
∂4
∂Y
< 0,
∂4
∂δF
< 0,
∂4
∂C
> 0,
∂4
∂δA
> 0,
∂4
∂µ0
< 0.
In addition,
∂4
∂a
= δA
1
(1− a)2 (1− µ0)C + δFµ0[(2a− 1)Y − C].
The sign of lima→0 ∂4∂a is ambiguous, but lima→1
∂4
∂a = +∞. Meanwhile, ∂
24
∂a2
> 0. Therefore, by
A-5
continuity there must exist aˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that
∂4
∂a
> 0, ∀a > aˆ. 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Without deadlines, the firm’s net present value from a stream of successive products is determined
from the following equation:
V ndF = µ0a(Y − R¯nd1 + δFV ndF ) + (1− µ0a)δF
[
µw1 a(Y − R¯nd2 ) + δFV ndF
]
.
Rearranging terms yields
V ndF =
Πnd + µ0a(R
nd
1 − R¯nd1 )
1− µ0aδF − (1− µ0a)δ2F
, (A15)
where Πnd is given by Equation (10) and Rnd1 − R¯nd1 is given by Equation (14) .
Recall that V dF =
1
1−δF (µ0aY − C) = 11−δF Πd. In the main model, the firm will prefer to impose a
deadline if and only if Πd > Πnd. In this extension, the firm will prefer to impose deadlines if and
only if V dF > V
nd
F . Therefore, we define
φ =
1
1− δF Π
nd − V ndF . (A16)
φ represents the relative value of deadlines in the extension relative to that in the main model. If
φ > 0, deadlines are more valuable in the extension than in the main model, other things being
equal; mathematically, the condition for the firm to prefer imposing deadlines is less stringent in the
extension than in the main model. The reverse is true if φ < 0. Collecting terms, we rewrite φ as
φ =
(1− µ0a)δFΠnd − µ0a(Rnd1 − R¯nd1 )
1− µ0aδF − (1− µ0a)δ2F
.
The sign of ∂φ∂δF is ambiguous. It depends on the magnitude of µ0a(R
nd
1 − R¯nd1 ), the payroll costs
the firm is expected to save due to the presence of future projects. However, it is easy to verify that
∂φ
∂δA
< 0. 
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Figure A1: Deadlines in Product Development – A Survey
(a) “The company I work(ed) with enforces hard deadlines in the product development process.”
(b) “Some of the products are still worth continuing at the time of the deadline.”
(c) “The less likely the product is going to succeed, the greater incentives the company has to offer
to motivate its product development workforce.”
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